April 6, 1862 (First day at the Battle of Shiloh)
In times of War and not Before,
God and Soldiers Men Adore.
But in Times of Peace
with all Things Righted,
God is Forgotten
and the Soldier Slighted.
– Rudyard Kipling
After the losses of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson to General Grant in February of 1862, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston withdrew his forces into western Tennessee, northern Mississippi, and Alabama to reorganize. During this time Union Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck removed Grant from his command for insubordination (lack of communications) quickly proven to be false.
Restored to full command Grant was ordered to move his six divisions known as the Army of the Tennessee (Union Army’s were named after rivers) to Pittsburg Landing in Tennessee. At the same time General Don Carlos Buell was ordered to join Grant with his Army of the Ohio. Halleck intended to take the field in person and lead both armies in an advance south to seize the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, a vital supply line between the Mississippi River Valley, Memphis, and Richmond at the junction in Corinth, Mississippi.
Grant’s army of 49k men consisted of six divisions, led by Maj. Gens. McClernand and Lew Wallace, and Brig. Gens. W. H. L. Wallace, Hurlbut, Sherman, and Prentiss. By early April, all six of the divisions were encamped on the western side of the Tennessee River, Lew Wallace’s at Crump’s Landing and the rest farther south at Pittsburg Landing.
General Johnston was fully aware of the positions of all Union troops in Tennesee as the loyal local population kept him well informed. His Army of Mississippi (Confederate Army’s were named after states) had 55k just south of Corinth. On April the 3rd 45K of these men marched to Pittsburg Landing hoping to hit Grant before he could join forces with Buell.
Maj. Gen. Polk, with two divisions under Brig. Gen. Clark and Maj. Gen. Cheatham, Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, with two divisions under Brig. Gens. Ruggles and Withers Maj. Gen. Hardee, with three brigades under Brig. Gens. Hindman, Cleburne, and Wood, Brig. Gen. Breckinridge, in reserve, with three brigades under Cols. Trabue and Statham, and Brig. Bowen, and attached cavalry.
Against the advice of his second in command General Beauregard who thought the test firing of weapons had given away their position, Johnston stated that he would “attack them if they were a million”. On the early morning of April 6, 1862 The Army of Mississippi launched the attack straddling the Corinth road hoping to force Grant’s left flank into abandoning Pittsburg Landing and seek refuge in the swamps where it could be destroyed piecemeal. They achieved a virtual tactical surprise and many union soldiers were bayoneted in their tents. Because of the surprise, Johnston’s poorly trained troops quickly fell into disarray (out pacing the supply wagons and stopping to plunder) and the original plan fell apart. Instead of separating the Union from the river they forced them towards it where Grant had a large reserve of Naval Weaponry (the BIG guns and mortars) at his command. The Confederate force became intermingled and command structure was lost. Confederate artillery became ineffective because the troops ran too far forward and would be hit by their own fire. Despite all these tactical blunders the Confederate attack was gaining ground at an alarming rate.
“Grant developed a reputation during the war for being more concerned with his own plans than with those of the enemy. His encampment at Pittsburg Landing displayed his most consequential lack of such concern—his army was spread out in bivouac style, many around the small log church named Shiloh (the Hebrew word that means “place of peace”), spending time waiting for Buell with drills for his many raw troops, without entrenchments or other awareness of defensive measures. In his memoirs, Grant reacted to criticism of his lack of entrenchments: “Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. … under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications.” Lew Wallace’s division was 5 miles (8 km) downstream (north) at Crump’s Landing, a position intended to prevent the placement of Confederate river batteries and to strike out at the railroad line at Bethel Station.” – Wikipedia During this time The Union Army had little cavalry for the Army of the Potomac back east was preparing an assault on Richmond and General McClellan was taking all of the resources. He had convinced Lincoln that with one swoop he could end the war. Had Grant the cavalry he needed there would have been no surprise at Shiloh.
Grant sent orders to Wallace to come up and support Sherman’s flank. It took him all day to get there because he took a different route than ordered starting one of the biggest controversies of the war. Wallace stated that his order was ambiguous. (out of charachter for Grant who’s orders were very precise) By the time Wallace arrived Sherman had retreated to a point where Wallace was now behind enemy lines. Instead of attacking from the rear he chose to retrace his route and join the front after the first days battle was over. Wallace’s division became known as “The Lost Division”. Grant was not pleased, and his endorsement of Wallace’s battle report was negative enough to damage Wallace’s military career severely. Today, Wallace is best remembered not as a general, but as the author of Ben-Hur.
Many famous battle names came from this first days fighting like “The Hornets Nest,” “Peach Orchard” and “The Sunken Road”. Because of the lack of command structure on the confederate side they chose to assail these death traps instead of bypassing them thereby suffering heavy casualties needlessly. There are estimates that the Confederates charged the Hornets Nest 14 times and were not able to break through until they assembled 60 cannon to bombard the union defenses for seven hours before they fell. Finding himself surrounded Union General Prentiss surrendered his remaining 2,400 men to the Confederates. However, this caused a lull in the fighting and bought time for Grant to set up a last defense on the hills outside of Pittsburg Landing. Setting up an impenetrable line of artillery firing down onto the confederate lines who were in open field halting the advance. During the Hornets Nest fighting the South suffered a serious setback with the death of the commanding General Johnston. While leading an attack through the Widow Bell’s cotton field, against the Peach Orchard, he was shot in the leg. Believing that the wound was insignificant he sent his surgeon away to care for injured soldiers. He bled to death within an hour from a severed artery. He was at that time the souths most effective general and the highest ranking officer on either side to die in combat. General Beauregard (who ordered the firing on Fort Sumter to start the war) assumed command and began an attack of the river defenses but was unsuccessful due to the arrival of portions of General Buells Army of the Ohio and the enfilade of cannon fire from the ridge.
The evening of April 6 put an end to the day’s fighting, of one of the bloodiest battles in American history.
“The Sabbath closed upon a scene which had no parallel on the Western Continent. The sun went down in a red halo, as if the very heavens blushed and prepared to weep at the enormity of man’s violence. Night fell upon and spread its funereal pall over a field of blood where death held unrestrained carnival! Soon after dark,- the rain descended in torrents, and all through the dreary hours of that dismal night it rained unceasingly. The groans of the dying, and the solemn thunder of the gunboats came swelling at intervals high above the peltings of the pitiless storm”. – Union Colonel Wills De Hass
A famous anecdote contains Grant’s unwavering attitude to temporary setbacks and his tendency for offensive action. As the exhausted Confederate soldiers bedded down in the abandoned Union camps he began shelling them with the naval weapons, Sherman encountered Grant under a tree, sheltering himself from the pouring rain. He was smoking one of his cigars while considering his losses and planning for the next day. Sherman remarked, “Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?” Grant looked up. “Yes. Lick ’em tomorrow, though.” That moment sealed their friendship and resolve to fight the war to its end.
This night would also have one of the biggest strategic blunders of the entire war. Beauregard sent a telegram to President Davis announcing “A complete victory” and later admitted, “I thought I had General Grant just where I wanted him and could finish him up in the morning.” His men were jubilant, having overrun the Union camps and taken thousands of prisoners, tons of supplies and weapons (many Confederate soldiers were using shotguns and flint lock rifles). But Grant had Lew Wallace’s division (the Lost Division), 15,000 men of the Army of the Ohio arriving that evening and in place by morning. Braxton Bragg and Albert Sidney Johnston’s son, Col. William Johnston, were among those who bemoaned the so-called “lost opportunity at Shiloh.” Beauregard did not come to the front to inspect the strength of the Union lines but remained at Shiloh Church. He also discounted intelligence reports from cavalry Col. Forrest (and from surrendered Gen. Prentiss) that Buell’s men were crossing the river to reinforce Grant. In defense of his decision, his troops were simply exhausted, there was less than an hour of daylight left, and Grant’s artillery advantage was formidable. He had also received a dispatch from Brig. Gen. Helm in northern Alabama, indicating that Buell was marching toward Decatur and not Pittsburg Landing.
(to be continued)